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The media often reports that the Korean Peninsula remains technically in a 
state of war, but there remains uncertainty about whether its countries are 
still legally at war. On December 6, 2010, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) released a statement that it was initiating a preliminary examination 
to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the sinking of the South 
Korean warship Cheonan by a North Korean submarine, as well as over 
North Korean artillery attacks near Yeonpyeong Island. For the two attacks 
to fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, they must be found to be “war 
crimes,” which would require that the laws of war (jus in bello) be in effect 
at the times they were committed. Because the signing of the Korean 
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Armistice Agreement in 1953 marked the conclusion of large-scale 
hostilities, questions have been raised as to whether the two attacks 
occurred in the context of a “war” or of an “armed conflict” under 
international law. This Article analyzes the concepts of war and of armed 
conflict, the general legal effects of armistice agreements, and the legal 
effects that a declaration of war might have in the context of the Korean 
Peninsula. If these two military confrontations in fact occurred during a 
war or an armed conflict, the ICC would have authority to punish the 
individuals responsible for committing any associated war crimes. However, 
if such a nexus is not proven, the ICC will lack clear authority to hold 
accountable the individuals responsible for these attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The incidents that occurred on the Korean Peninsula in 2010 are reminders 
that the situation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea or DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK) remains tense. 
There have been sporadic naval clashes and military provocations in the past, but 
the status quo has remained the same. 
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On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval ship Cheonan sank in the 
waters around Yeonpyeong Island near the maritime border, killing forty-six South 
Korean marines.1 That May, an international team comprised of experts from 
South Korea, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden 
investigated the incident and concluded that the Cheonan was sunk by a torpedo 
fired by a North Korean submarine. 2  However, North Korea has denied 
involvement.3 The case was brought to the United Nations Security Council, 
which issued a Presidential Statement condemning the attack.4 Tensions escalated 
further on November 23, 2010, when the DPRK launched an artillery attack on the 
ROK’s Yeonpyeong Island, approximately two miles from the Northern Limit 
Line (NLL).5 During this incident, North Korea fired dozens of artillery shells and 
rockets at Yeonpyeong Island, resulting in the deaths of two South Korean marines 
and two civilians.6 South Korea fired rockets back, but the exact number of North 
Korean casualties has not been reported.7 The DPRK blames the ROK for this 
incident, arguing that South Korea initiated live fire exercises in North Korean 
waters.8 This attack on Yeonpyeong Island marks the first time that the DPRK has 
openly targeted civilians since North and South Korea signed the Armistice 
Agreement in 1953. 
 
As tensions escalated on the peninsula, these incidents were brought to the 
attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has authority to 
prosecute individuals for war crimes.9 On December 6, 2010, the Prosecutor of the 
                                                                                                                       
1 Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Searches for Survivors of Sunken Navy Ship, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/world/asia/28korea.html?scp=3&sq=cheonan&st=nyt. 
2 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, Investigation Result on the Sinking of 
ROKS “Cheonan”, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA (May 20, 
2010), 
http://www.mnd.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engbdread.jsp?typeID=16&boar
did=88&seqno=871&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=3&tableName=ENGBASIC&pc=undefine
d&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=&st=. 
3 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Denies Role in Sinking of Warship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/world/asia/18korea.html?_r=1&gwh=5D8EC4F9167
DD50D882DA0A377847BA9. 
4 S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/13, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/13 (July 9, 2010). 
5 Mark McDonald, ‘Crisis Status’ in South Korea After North Shells Island, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?_r=1&src=mv. 
6 Two Civilians Found Dead on Devastated Yeonpyeong Island, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 25, 
2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/11/25/2010112500683.html. 
7 McDonald, supra note 5. 
8 Id. 
9 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, opened for signature July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 92 (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most 
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ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, released a statement saying that the court had 
received communications alleging that North Korean forces had committed war 
crimes in South Korean territory.10 As a result, the ICC began to examine these 
allegations so as to determine whether the incidents constituted war crimes and 
thus would fall under its jurisdiction.11 
 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to which 
South Korea is party, provides that war crimes include: 
 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 . . . (b) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established 
framework of international law . . . [and] (c) . . . serious violations 
of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 . . . .12 
 
Since war crimes are by definition violations of the laws of war, the laws 
of war, including the Geneva Conventions, The Hague Conventions, and other 
relevant treaties and case law, must be in effect at the time of a confrontation for 
related activities to constitute war crimes. In other words, the sinking of the 
Cheonan and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island must have occurred during a war or 
an armed conflict, as distinct from a border clash or an internal disturbance.13 
 
The media often report that the Korean Peninsula remains “technically at 
war,”14 but it is unclear whether the Korean Peninsula is, as a matter of law, in a 
state of war or armed conflict. The ROK, DPRK, United States, and United 
Nations have yet to establish clear positions on this matter. The parties to the 
Korean Armistice agree that a peace agreement should be concluded, but have not 
                                                                                                                       
serious crimes of concern to the international community . . . [specifically] genocide . . . 
[c]rimes against humanity . . . [w]ar crimes . . . [and] [t]he crime of aggression.”). 
10 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor: Alleged War Crimes in the 
Territory of the Republic of Korea Under Preliminary Examination (Dec. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/46A212DA-6CDC-48F7-8F9A-
DF5FB5B8BBD5/282744/KoreaEng1.pdf. 
11 Id. 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 8, ¶ 2(a)-(c), 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 94-97. 
13 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II] (distinguishing the Protocol, which covers 
“organized armed groups,” from “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature”). 
14 See, e.g., Kenneth Chamberlain, Nearly 60 Years After the Armistice, Korean War 
Hasn’t Ended, NAT’L J. (July 27, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/pictures-
video/nearly-60-years-after-armistice-korean-war-hasn-t-ended-pictures-20120727. 
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announced an official position regarding whether they presently consider 
themselves to be in a state of war. For the past sixty years, political leaders have 
ignored the question, but these recent confrontations have initiated discussions on 
the issue. Recent attention can be attributed to the international community’s 
ongoing efforts to hold North Korean leaders accountable for war crimes, making 
it necessary to analyze the Korean Peninsula conflict under objective principles of 
international law. 
 
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, it was clear 
from a legal standpoint that a war had begun. Large-scale hostilities on the 
peninsula lasted for three years, ending when the Korean Armistice Agreement 
was signed in 1953.15 The parties agreed to hold another conference at a later date 
to finalize a peace agreement, and to abide until that time by the terms of the 
Armistice.16 Since the parties have thus far failed to finalize a peace settlement, the 
effect of the Armistice on the legal status of the conflict, and the applicability of 
the laws of war, are ambiguous. If the media is correct that the Korean Peninsula 
remains at war, it could imply that the belligerent rights of the parties have 
remained in effect for the past sixty years, but this would contradict the U.N. 
Charter prohibition on the use of force.17 On the other hand, if the Armistice 
Agreement terminated the war, jus in bello would not apply to any subsequent 
events. Then the attacks against the Cheonan and at Yeonpyeong Island would not 
be war crimes, and the ICC would not have authority to prosecute the leaders of 
North Korea. 
 
If these confrontations are not war crimes, they may constitute the crime 
of aggression,18 but the ICC does not yet have jurisdiction over the crime of 
                                                                                                                       
15 Agreement Between the Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One 
Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of 
the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in 
Korea, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234 [hereinafter Korean Armistice Agreement]. 
16 Id. 
17 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”). 
18 Cf. Special Working Group. on the Crime of Aggression of the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, in ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RESUMED SIXTH SESSION, NEW YORK, 
2-6 JUNE 2008, OFFICIAL RECORDS 9, 20 (2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-6-20-Add.1%20English.pdf (proposing to define the 
crime of aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,” and the act of aggression as “the 
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aggression.19 Therefore, the ROK would have no currently available means by 
which to hold the North Korean leaders accountable. While there are international 
efforts underway to grant the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the 
most recent of which was at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in 
Kampala in 2010,20 and the ICC anticipates gaining jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression in 2017,21 the Rome Statute’s principle of non-retroactivity is an 
obstacle in the quest to hold North Korean leaders accountable for the attacks on 
the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island.22 For that reason, this Article will focus on 
the central question of whether jus in bello was in effect at the time of the two 
military provocations, to determine the possibility of holding North Korean leaders 
accountable for war crimes. 
 
This Article is divided into four main parts. First, I review the background 
history of the Korean War. Second, I examine the legal concepts of war and armed 
conflict to determine when jus in bello applies. Third, I analyze the effects of the 
Armistice on the status of the Korean conflict, looking comparatively at other 
armistices under international law, as well as bringing in scholarly opinions, state 
practices, and U.N. Charter principles. Fourth and finally, I assess both North 
Korea’s denunciation of the Armistice and the recent small-scale resumption of 
hostilities. In 2009, North Korea declared that it was no longer bound to the 
Armistice.23 This declaration may impact the status of the conflict, because it may 
be tantamount to a declaration of war. In addition, the attacks on the Cheonan and 
on Yeonpyeong Island may have resumed hostilities sufficiently to consider the 
situation one of “armed conflict,” in which case jus in bello could be invoked 
regardless of whether the two states were in a state of war. 
II. A BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR 
                                                                                                                       
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations”). 
19 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 5, ¶ 2, 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 92 (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted . . . .”). 
20 Review Conference of the Rome Statute Concludes in Kampala, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.kampala.icc-cpi.info (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). Actual jurisdiction for the 
crime of aggression is expected to take effect after January 1, 2017, provided that the 
majority of States Parties supports it, as is required to adopt an amendment to the Rome 
Statute. Id. 
21 Cf. id. 
22 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 24, 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 105 (“No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct 
prior to the entry into force of the Statute.”). 
23 See infra Section V.B. 
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The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded 
South Korea after tensions arose in the midst of negotiating Korean elections.24 
Shortly thereafter, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 82, stating that the 
invasion was a threat to international peace and security or a “breach of peace” 
and calling for the “immediate cessation of hostilities” by requesting that North 
Korea withdraw its troops.25 In addition, the Security Council asked that members 
render assistance to the United Nations and refrain from supporting the North 
Korean authorities.26 That same day, President Truman announced that United 
States armed forces would assist the ROK in thwarting the invasion,27 which 
marked the beginning of the United States’ involvement in the Korean War. These 
resolutions were adopted without the Soviet Union’s involvement, because since 
early 1950 the U.S.S.R. had been boycotting meetings of the Security Council due 
to the Council’s failure to replace its Republic of China representative with a 
Communist following their victory in the Chinese Civil War in late 1949.28 
 
On July 7, 1950, the Security Council adopted Resolution 84, which gave 
the U.S.-led Unified Command full authority to use the United Nations flag at its 
discretion and to designate the commander of such forces.29 As a result, under the 
aegis of the United Nations, and with the support of its allies, the United States 
took part in the conflict with General Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief 
of the U.N. forces. On October 18, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River, which 
marks the border between China and North Korea, and joined the fight against the 
United Nations.30 By this time, the Soviet Union had returned to the Security 
Council, immobilizing the Council’s ability to adopt further resolutions regarding 
the Korean War. Consequently, the General Assembly enacted its own resolutions, 
allowing the United Nations to participate further in the war.31 
 
On July 27, 1953, representatives from the U.N. Command and from the 
combined Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers signed the 
Armistice Agreement to cease hostilities on the peninsula.32 The Agreement’s 
preamble states the cease-fire agreement will “insure a complete cessation of 
hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement 
                                                                                                                       
24 Cf. S.C. Res. 82, pmbl., art. I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. art. III. 
27 SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 14 (1992). 
28 Id. at 12. 
29 S.C. Res. 84, art. III, U.N. Doc. S/RES/84 (July 7, 1950). 
30 BAILEY, supra note 27, at 34. 
31 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 377 (V), 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950) 
(assuming the right to exercise emergency powers when faced with a breach of the peace 
and Security Council inaction). 
32 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, 4 U.S.T. at 261. 
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is achieved.”33 It also states that “the conditions and terms of armistice . . . are 
intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents 
in Korea.”34 Paragraph 62 states that the Armistice “shall remain in effect until 
expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or 
by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political 
level between both sides.”35 On August 29, 1953, the General Assembly passed a 
resolution “[noting] with approval the Armistice Agreement.”36 
 
A military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) were 
established on and around the 38th parallel, with North Korean troops on one side 
and South Korean, U.N., and U.S. troops on the other.37 In addition, the Military 
Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 
(NNSC) were created to supervise the implementation of the Armistice 
Agreement.38 However, these commissions were immobilized when the DPRK 
refused to cooperate after disputing their neutrality.39 
 
In February 1954, the parties attempted to start negotiations for a peace 
agreement at the Geneva Conference, but talks foundered.40 North Korea, South 
Korea, China and the United States made another attempt to reach a peace 
settlement during the Four-Party Talks in Geneva from 1997 to 1998, but failed to 
come to an agreement because of the DPRK’s request that U.S. troops withdraw 
from the peninsula.41 Further peace talks are not expected in the near future, due to 
the lack of progress in denuclearizing North Korea since the Six-Party Talks came 
to a halt in 2007. 
 
While North Korea has called for peace negotiations,42 official statements 
by the ROK and United States have stated that signing a peace agreement is 
conditional on North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapons program. In 2009, 
                                                                                                                       
33 Id. pmbl., 4 U.S.T. at 236. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. ¶ 62, 4 U.S.T. at 261. 
36 G.A. Res. 711 (VII), ¶ 1, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/711(VII) (Aug. 28, 1953) 
(emphasis omitted). 
37 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 1, 4 U.S.T. at 237. 
38 Id. 
39 BAILEY, supra note 27, at 171-88. 
40 Id. at 150. 
41 See generally Four-Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula, 1997-98, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/korea_4party_talks_1997.html (last modified Dec. 
2, 1998). 
42 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Calls for Peace Treaty Talks with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/world/asia/12korea.html (“‘If a peace treaty 
is signed, it will help resolve hostile relations between North Korea and the United States 
and speed up the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry said in a statement carried by the North’s state-run news agency, K.C.N.A.”). 
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Stephen W. Bosworth, President Obama’s special representative on North Korea, 
mentioned that the U.S. government envisions Northeast Asia with a 
denuclearized North Korea and a peace regime replacing the 1953 Armistice.43 He 
asserted that the United States would discuss a peace treaty and other incentives 
only when the process of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula had gained 
“significant traction.”44 Recent ROK administrations have taken similar positions 
that North Korea must show genuine willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons 
program before peace negotiations can resume. 45  Meanwhile, sporadic naval 
clashes and military provocations have continued on the Korean Peninsula, with 
military tensions peaking in 2010 due to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island 
incidents. 
 
In February 2012, the United States and North Korea agreed through 
bilateral talks in Beijing that North Korea would suspend nuclear weapons testing 
and uranium enrichment, and would comply with the Korean Armistice 
Agreement as part of a deal including an American pledge to ship food to North 
Korea.46 But almost immediately afterwards, in April 2012, the DPRK fired a 
long-range rocket from the Tongchang-ri base, which South Korean authorities 
claimed disintegrated soon after its launch and fell into the Yellow Sea.47 North 
                                                                                                                       
43 Stephen W. Bosworth, Remarks at the Korea Society Annual Dinner (June 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/06/124567.htm. 
44 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Sees Progress in U.S. Envoy’s Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/world/asia/11korea.html (“[Stephen W.] 
Bosworth said that once six-nation talks reconvened and gained ‘a significant traction’ on 
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, the United States and its allies would be ready to 
discuss the incentives offered in the 2005 agreement: economic aid, security guarantees, 
normalized relations with Washington and a peace treaty.”). 
45  See KOREAN INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, POLICY OF MUTUAL BENEFITS AND 
COMMON PROSPERITY 13 (2008) (expressing the Lee Myung-bak administration’s position 
that “[i]t will be impossible to establish a genuine peace without resolving the North 
Korean nuclear issue”); see also Park Geun-hye, A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust 
Between Seoul and Pyongyang, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2011, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68136/park-geun-hye/a-new-kind-of-
korea?page=show (“Should the North relinquish its nuclear weapons and behave 
peacefully . . . [s]uch developments would contribute significantly to the establishment of a 
more enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.”). Ms. Park is the recently elected 
successor to President Lee. 
46 Jane Perlez, U.S. and North Korea Hold Talks in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at 
A12. 
47 (3rd LD) N. Korea’s Rocket Launch Appears to End in Failure: Officials, YONHAP 
NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 13, 2012, 8:53 KST),  
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/04/13/56/0301000000AEN2012041300125
1315F.HTML. For a chronology of North Korea’s missile and rocket launches, see 
Chronology of North Korea’s Missile, Rocket Launches, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 13, 
2012, 10:53 KST),  
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Korea followed this with a rocket launch in December 2012,48 and has promised to 
continue both its rocket launches and its nuclear weapons tests.49 It remains to be 
seen whether the new government of Kim Jong-un will continue with the bait-and-
switch tactics of the past, combined with periodic brinkmanship and provocation, 
or engage more seriously with its international commitments; however, the 
forecast is not promising. 
III. A KOREAN APPLICATION OF JUS IN BELLO 
Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions stipulates that “in addition 
to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them.”50 Therefore, jus in bello applies 
when there is a “declared war” or “armed conflict.”51 However, the Geneva 
Conventions do not define these two terms, even though they are widely used 
throughout. It is also not clear that the terms differ in meaning: they seem to be 
used interchangeably, but sometimes in different contexts. For example, “war” is 
used as a broader concept with more political significance, while “armed conflict” 
is used to refer to actual hostilities. In order to better understand the two concepts, 
this Article will analyze the definitions provided in legal cases and by scholars. 
A. Defining “War” 
Lassa Oppenheim’s classic treatise, International Law, defines war as “a 
contention between two or more states through their armed forces, for the purpose 
                                                                                                                       
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/04/13/29/0401000000AEN20120413003
300315F.HTML. 
48 Tania Branigan, North Korea Defiant as UN Security Council Condemns Rocket Launch, 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/23/north-korea-
defiant-un-rocket-launch (reporting on the DPRK’s December 2012 test and its “harsh 
response” to a resolution correspondingly extending sanctions on the country). 
49  Justin McCurry & Tania Branigan, North Korea: Pyongyang Plans Nuclear Test 
Targeted at US, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2013,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/24/north-korea-nuclear-rocket-us (relating 
Pyongyang’s promise of a nuclear test and rocket launches in the near future). 
50 First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [together, hereinafter, Geneva Conventions]. 
51 Id. 
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of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor 
pleases.”52 A key element in this definition is that a war is an armed contention 
between states, which means that a civil war would not be considered “war” in the 
technical sense of the term.53 This aspect may be obsolete, as common article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions recognized that conflicts could be purely domestic.54 
Oppenheim’s definition of war also requires the use of armed force. While this 
would seem to be obvious, armed force is not necessarily a prerequisite under 
international law. For example, Ian Brownlie has argued that there are 
circumstances in which parties can be at war technically or de jure in its absence.55 
War de jure can exist, for example, during a cease-fire or when belligerents are not 
close enough to engage in hostilities, as sometimes was the case during the Second 
World War.56 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the notion of a 
“technical” war in the Corfu Channel case, in which it ruled that Greece and 
Albania were “technically at war.”57 The opposite, a de facto state of war, can 
exist when hostilities or fighting between two parties have commenced, even 
though no declarations of war have been made.58 The distinction between these 
two conditions exists because in the early 20th century a formal declaration of war 
was an important criterion for determining the applicability of the laws of war. It 
was then common practice for states to declare war, as provided under the 
Conventions adopted at The Hague in 1907, in order to call upon the protection 
afforded under those rules.59  For example, article 2 of the Convention (III) 
                                                                                                                       
52 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). Four 
elements are distinct here: (i) existence of contention, namely of a violent struggle 
involving the application of armed force, (ii) conflict between states (civil “wars,” and 
engagements with insurgents or pirates, do not qualify), (iii) use of armed forces (those 
private subjects of the belligerents who do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed 
forces do not take part in the fighting), and (iv) an aim of overpowering the enemy. 
53 Id. at 209. 
54 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116 (“In the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties . . . .”). For a definition of “armed conflict,” see infra Section III.B. 
55 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 26-28 (1963); 
see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 9-10 (4th ed. 2005). 
56 DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 9; ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR & ARTHUR D. WATTS, THE 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 3 (4th ed. 1966); Quincy Wright, When Does War Exist?, 26 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 362, 363 (1932). 
57 Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 
(Apr. 9). 
58 See BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 26-28; DINSTEIN, supra note 55 at 9-10. 
59 See Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2259, 2271 (“The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must 
not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned 
declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”). 
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Relative to the Opening of Hostilities states that “[t]he existence of a state of war 
must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in 
regard to them until after the receipt of a notification.”60 
 
As a result, it was common for the legal state of war to begin with a 
declaration of war. When a declaration of war was made, the laws of war became 
applicable and governed the conduct of hostilities, and relations with neutral 
parties became subject to the laws of neutrality.61 Therefore, a declaration of war 
was an important element in determining the legal status of a conflict, and was 
useful because it emphasized the parties’ intentions. Brownlie follows this logic 
when he argues that “[s]tate practice has emphasized that war is not a legal 
concept linked with objective phenomena such as large-scale hostilities between 
the armed forces of organized state entities but a legal status the existence of 
which depends on the intention of one or more of the states concerned.”62 Dr. 
(later Lord) McNair likewise emphasized that state intentions were determinative, 
and that war only existed if one of the parties declared itself at war.63 
 
While it had become the general rule that jus in bello applied either in the 
case of “declared war” or (declared or undeclared) actual “armed conflict,”64 
scholars are now revisiting the question of whether a declaration of war, standing 
alone, triggers the rules governing war. In the past, declarations were important, 
but this traditional means of instigating war has become increasingly uncommon. 
The adoption of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of force under article 2, 
paragraph 4, has made members of the international community reluctant to 
announce their engagement in warfare.65 Christopher Greenwood has questioned 
                                                                                                                       
60 Id. art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2271. 
61 See BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 19; Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in 
Modern International Law, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 283, 284 (1987). Note the subtitle of 
the second volume of Oppenheim’s treatise: “Disputes, War and Neutrality.” See generally 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 52. Earlier editions were subtitled simply “War and Neutrality.” 
See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1912). 
62 BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 26 (footnote omitted). 
63 See Arnold D. McNair, The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 
11 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 29, 29 (1925) (“[Courts] have consistently . . . adhered 
to the view that war is a matter peculiarly within the prerogative of the Crown, and that 
they ought to look to the Crown to give some indication of the existence of war, as indeed 
it usually does, by Proclamation. [B]oth as regards the beginning and the end of a war, an 
English Court is bound by the duly manifested opinion of the Crown on the question 
whether this country is at war or at peace with another.”); see also Greenwood, supra note 
61, at 286 (identifying Lord McNair as a subjectivist and also identifying a rival objectivist 
school of thought). 
64 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3116. 
65 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
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the current relevance of war as a legal concept, since it appears to be incompatible 
with the U.N. Charter.66 He posits that a declaration ipso facto would violate the 
Charter because it would be a threat of force, and furthermore points out that a 
state could not validate an illegal hostile act by making a declaration of war.67 
Greenwood concludes by arguing that “[i]t is the factual concept of armed conflict 
rather than the technical concept of war which makes [the rules of war] 
applicable.”68 
 
Similarly, Jean Pictet’s commentary on the Geneva Conventions’ common 
article 2 indicates that a declaration of war no longer affects the status of a 
conflict.69 Rather, he notes that the existence of an armed conflict among parties to 
                                                                                                                       
United Nations.”); see also INT’L LAW ASSOC., FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF 
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2010), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87 (“The United 
Nations Charter . . . prohibits all use of force except in self-defence or with Security 
Council authorisation. After the adoption of the Charter, governments and jurists began to 
abandon the use of the term ‘war’. It is still possible for states to find themselves in a state 
of war or to make formal declarations . . . . Many national constitutions still require formal 
declarations of war in some circumstances. Such a declaration is not contrary to 
international law unless (depending on the context) it constitutes a threat within the 
meaning of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.”). While the two Koreas have been 
members of the United Nations only since 1991, the United Nations is not only a party to 
the Armistice, but has been alert to the problems of Korean sovereignty and partition since 
at least 1947. See Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (listing member states and 
dates of admission); Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, 4 U.S.T. at 261 (naming 
the signatories to the Armistice as Nam Il, General of the Korean People’s Army, and 
Senior Delegate from the Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers; and William K. Harrison, Jr., Lieutenant General in the United States 
Army, and Senior Delegate from the United Nations Command Delegation); G.A. Res. 112 
(II), 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/112(II) (Nov. 14, 1947) (establishing and appointing a 
U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea to oversee elections); see also G.A. Res. 195 (III), 
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/195(III) (Dec. 12, 1948) (recognizing the Republic of Korea as 
the only lawful and democratically elected government in the country); G.A. Res. 293 (IV), 
4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/293(IV) (Oct. 21, 1949) (monitoring the rising potential for 
military conflict in Korea); S.C. Res. 82, supra note 24 (from 1950). 
66 See generally Greenwood, supra note 61. 
67 Id. at 301-02. 
68 Id. at 304. 
69 1 JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 32 (1952) (“There 
is no longer any need for a formal declaration of war, or for recognition of the state of war, 
as preliminaries to the application of the Convention. The Convention becomes applicable 
as from the actual opening of hostilities. The existence of armed conflict between two or 
more Contracting Parties brings it automatically into operation.”). 
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the Conventions automatically brings the Conventions into operation.70 As a result, 
the term “war” is now being abandoned by “governments and jurists,” and has 
been replaced with the broader concept of “armed conflict.”71 However, this does 
not mean that the concept of “war” is insignificant in international law today. 
Under the Geneva Conventions, a declaration of war is one of the triggers for 
applying jus in bello and, although rare, there may be situations devoid of actual 
hostilities where such laws should be applied.72 For example, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention may apply if one state is interning nationals of another state, even if 
hostilities are absent between the two.73 Yoram Dinstein further describes cases of 
“status mixtus” involving “a limited use of force ‘short of war,’” where “a state of 
peace continues to prevail” but “the actual fighting [is] regulated by the . . . rules 
of warfare.”74 In sum, the concept of “war” is still significant in international law, 
but the adoption of the U.N. Charter has circumscribed its relevance. 
B. Defining “Armed Conflict” 
While the term “armed conflict,” is freely used throughout both the 
Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, it is not defined.75 There has 
been substantial debate in international tribunals and courts about the difference 
                                                                                                                       
70 Id.; see also Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3116 (“[T]he . . . 
Convention[s] shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them. . . . Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a 
party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by 
it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation 
to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.”). 
71 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 6-9 (“To summarise, although the term ‘war’ may 
still have some significance in a few areas such as for some national constitutions, or some 
domestic contracts, in international law the term ‘war’ no longer has the importance that it 
had in the pre-[U.N.] Charter period. . . . [The term ‘law of war’ is] still in use today 
although the [terms] ‘law of armed conflict’ or [‘international humanitarian law’ (IHL)] 
are more generally accepted.”). The authors note that the “so-called ‘war on terror’” marks 
an exception to this decline. Id. at 7. 
72 See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 10 (“Of course, if a state of war exists in the technical 
sense only—and no hostilities are taking place—the issue of the application of the jus in 
bello rarely emerges in practice.”). Dinstein provides the example of one state threatening 
another with total war. Id. at 10 n.31. 
73 Cf. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, supra note 50, art. 42, 6 U.S.T. at 3544 (“The internment or placing in assigned 
residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power 
makes it absolutely necessary.”). 
74 DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 16. 
75 See Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 77, 78 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan 
Breau eds., 2007) (“[T]he relevant treaties . . . contain no general definition of what 
constitutes an armed conflict, whether international or non-international.”). 
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between an “international armed conflict” and a “non-international armed conflict,” 
but none of the treaties on armed conflict provide a legal definition for the term. 
“In practice . . . States, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, the ICRC [(International Committee of the Red Cross)], courts, 
scholars, and others” have identified various types of armed conflicts, but may 
reach conflicting and politically motivated conclusions. 76  Therefore, in this 
Section, this Article attempts to lay out some principles for defining “armed 
conflict.” 
 
The United States needs to have a better understanding of what constitutes 
armed conflict under international law because the definition of the term affects 
whether the United States has the legal authority to exercise belligerent rights 
against terrorist groups in its “War on Terror.” “In May 2005, the Executive 
Committee of the International Law Association (ILA) approved a mandate for the 
Use of Force Committee to produce a report on the meaning of ‘war’ or ‘armed 
conflict’ in international law.”77 It was tasked with distinguishing laws that apply 
during peacetime from laws applicable during armed conflict.78 Although this 
distinction is muddled as conflicts become more complex, the Committee 
attempted to identify some core elements that differentiated the state of armed 
conflict from the state of peace.79 In creating a legal definition for “armed conflict,” 
the Committee studied treaties, the practice of states, judicial decisions of 
international and regional courts, and opinions of legal scholars.80 
 
According to the Committee’s 2010 report, the modern international 
community shares a common understanding of armed conflict, and there are two 
minimum characteristics that distinguish armed conflict from non-armed conflict 
and from peace.81  These minimum characteristics are (i) “[t]he existence of 
organized armed groups,” and (ii) that such groups are “[e]ngaged in fighting of 
some intensity.” 82  The Committee’s analysis was based on the Geneva 
Conventions,83 the Rome Statute,84 and, particularly, the International Criminal 
                                                                                                                       
76 Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). 
77 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 1 (reporting on how international law defines and 
distinguishes situations of armed conflict from those situations in which peacetime law 
prevails). 
78 Id. 
79  Id. at 1-2 (“All armed conflict has certain minimal, defining characteristics that 
distinguish it from situations of non-armed conflict or peace.”). 
80 Id. at 2 (“The Committee . . . examined treaties; state practice and opinion juris; and . . . 
judicial decisions, and the writing of scholars.”). 
81 Id. (“The Committee confirmed that at least two characteristics are found with respect to 
all armed conflict.”). 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 29 (“The underlying theme is that there must be a sufficient level of 
organisation through a command structure in order for the basic requirements of Common 
Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to be implemented.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
which is recognized as the authoritative case defining both international and non-
international armed conflict.85 
 
In Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the ICTY listed factors relevant to assessing 
armed groups’ levels of military organization: command structures, exercise of 
leadership control, rule-based governance, provision of military training, 
organized acquisition and provision of weapons and supplies, recruitment of new 
members, existence of communications infrastructure, and space to rest.86 After 
investigating a situation in the Republic of Kenya, the ICC affirmed this standard 
                                                                                                                       
29 n.178 (“See Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (referring to High 
Contracting Parties); Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (‘organised military 
forces’); art 1 of Additional Protocol II (‘or other organised armed groups’) and Rome 
Statute art 8(2)(e).”); see also Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3116 
(applying “the present Convention . . . to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,” or to the 
“occupation . . . of a High Contracting Party,” implying that the actors that the 
Conventions take cognizance of have sufficient degrees of organization to sign treaties, 
wage wars, and occupy territories); id. art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18 (referring to, “[i]n the 
case of armed conflict not of an international character,” the requirement that “each Party 
to the conflict . . . be bound to” treat non-combatants humanely and to “collect[] and care[] 
for” “[t]he sick and wounded,” likewise implying significant organizational structure, 
control, and resources). 
84 See INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 29 n.178. 
85 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995) (“[An armed conflict] exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State . . . . These hostilities [infighting 
within the former Yugoslavia] exceed the intensity requirements applicable to both 
international and internal armed conflicts. There has been protracted, large-scale violence 
between the armed forces of different States and between governmental forces and 
organized insurgent groups.”); see also Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 
Trial Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-
60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 536 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial 
Judgment, ¶¶ 566-68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003). See 
generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998). 
86 See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement 
of Acquittal, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004). 
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in a pre-trial decision, asserting that it would have to recognize a non-state actor as 
organized before it would recognize a situation as an armed conflict.87 
 
Factors determining a conflict’s intensity include the number of fighters 
involved, the types and quantities of weapons used, the duration and territorial 
extent of the fighting, the number of casualties, and the extent of destruction of 
property.88 Other factors include population displacement and the involvement of 
the Security Council or of other actors to broker a cease-fire.89 However, in 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that these factors were 
not determinative, and that hostilities at a lower level of intensity might be 
classified as armed conflict if other criteria were met.90 In addition, the Tadic 
decision indicated that armed hostilities had to occur over a “protracted” period of 
time for an armed conflict to be found.91 Duration of conflict thus is an important 
factor in determining the existence of non-international armed conflict, as 
distinguished from other “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, [or] 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence,” as carved out by article 1, paragraph 2 of 
the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions or, similarly, as exempt 
under article 8 of the Rome Statute.92 Tadic does not specify how long this 
“protracted” period of time should last, but no tribunal has recognized an armed 
conflict which lasted for fewer than thirty hours, and did not result in casualties 
and property destruction, as “protracted.”93 
                                                                                                                       
87 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber 
Authorization, ¶ 53 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
88 See Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 177 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
89 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 30. 
90 See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). 
91  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). For the interpretation of “protracted armed violence” by the ICTY, see Haradinaj, 
Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶¶ 40-49. 
92 See Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1, ¶ 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 (“This Protocol shall not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.”); see also 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 8, ¶ 2(c)-(d), 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 97 (defining certain actions committed against non-combatants in 
contravention of “article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions” as war crimes, “[i]n 
the case of an armed conflict not of an international character,” and clarifying that this 
definition “applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”). 
93 See INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 2; see also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 149-51 
(1997) (characterizing an engagement of armed forces with militants that lasted thirty 
hours as an armed conflict). 
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As the nature of conflict has become more complex, it has become more 
difficult to determine the existence of armed conflict. This difficulty is at issue 
because the ILA report states that armed conflicts should be distinguished, inter 
alia, from “incidents,” “border clashes,” ‘internal disturbances,” “terrorism,” and 
tensions such as riots or other isolated and sporadic acts of violence.94 When 
compared with war, armed conflict is defined by more-objective criteria that 
consider the facts at hand, while war is defined by subjective criteria that look to 
the parties’ intentions. Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions could apply during a 
state of war even if there were no hostilities, while the Geneva Conventions could 
apply to a state of armed conflict only if there were actual hostilities. However, 
because the U.N. Charter has made the concept of war increasingly meaningless, it 
is rare to attempt to apply jus in bello to a state of war in the absence of hostilities. 
C. Application 
When the DPRK invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the beginning of 
large-scale hostilities made it clear that the peninsula was in a state of armed 
conflict.95 At that time, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the ROK 
as the only government with a legitimate right to control the Korean Peninsula.96 
Nevertheless, North Korea had a large de facto military that possessed a command 
structure that would have satisfied the Milosevic test. In response, the United 
Nations recognized North Korea as a belligerent in Security Council Resolution 
                                                                                                                       
94 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 28. 
95 See BAILEY, supra note 27, at 10 (“At 4.a.m. (local time) on Sunday, 25 June (24 June in 
the United States), in driving rain, over 100 000 North Koreans struck across the 38th 
parallel, the main thrust being in the Haeju sector and towards Seoul, the South Korean 
capital.”) (footnote omitted). 
96 G.A. Res. 195 (III), supra note 65; see also S.C. Res. 82, supra note 24 (“The Security 
Council, [r]ecalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21 
October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established 
government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the 
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in 
which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on 
elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of 
Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only 
such government in Korea . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). A Joint Commission had been 
established to set up a provisional Korean government, and the General Assembly had 
passed a resolution calling for elections held under the auspices of the U.N. Temporary 
Commission on Korea. See G.A. Res. 112 (II), supra note 65. Therefore, an election was 
held in May 10, 1948 with Syngman Rhee being elected as President, but the Soviet Union 
refused to permit the members of the Commission to enter the portion of the peninsula, 
which it occupied. A People’s Committee adopted a constitution for North Korea in July 
1948, and Kim Il-sung became the Prime Minister of Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. Cf. S.C. Res. 82, supra note 24. 
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82.97 The existence of an “armed conflict” on the Korean Peninsula became 
official when the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 82, which declared 
that the invasion constituted a “breach of the peace.”98 In addition, the Security 
Council called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of 
North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.99 Even though the two Koreas were not 
parties to the Geneva Conventions at the time of the invasion,100 the Supreme 
Commander of the U.N. Forces and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK 
both declared that they would abide by the Conventions, which implied that both 
sides considered themselves to be in a state of war or armed conflict.101 As a result, 
the Korean War became an internationalized, yet not an international, armed 
conflict once the United Nations became involved. 
 
Whether that state of war or armed conflict continued to exist after the 
belligerent parties signed the Armistice Agreement is ambiguous, because actual 
hostilities ended on July 27, 1953. Gerhard von Glahn has argued that even if a 
state of armed conflict ended, the Korean “War” remains ongoing, because the 
parties have never signed a peace agreement. 102  Although article 62 of the 
Armistice Agreement merely states that it is to remain in effect until a peace 
settlement is reached, the treaty’s language implies that the parties anticipated 
reaching a peace agreement in the near future to permanently end the war.103 The 
ongoing implications of the Armistice have become more complex with North 
Korea’s 2009 and 2013 declarations that it is no longer to be bound to the 
agreement.104 While such statements could be regarded as new declarations of war, 
                                                                                                                       
97 See G.A. Res. 195 (III), supra note 65, at pmbl. (“The Security Council . . . [n]oting with 
grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, 
[d]etermines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and [c]alls for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
98 Id. 
99 See id. art. I. 
100 The ROK became a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1966, whereas the DPRK 
became a party in 1957. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATES PARTY TO THE 
FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 
15-NOV-2012, at 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/%28SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_relat
ed_Treaties.pdf. 
101 LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 55 (1993). 
102 GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 727 (6th ed. 1992). 
103 Cf. Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 60, 4 U.S.T. at 260 (“[T]he military 
Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries 
concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is 
signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be 
held . . . to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”). 
104 See infra Section V.B. 
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it is unclear whether a belligerent party is able to terminate an armistice, or this 
one in particular, through a mere unilateral declaration or announcement.105 
 
If a state of war continues to exist, both North and South Korea may 
permissibly exercise belligerent rights. Although scholars such as Greenwood 
have argued that war has become legally insignificant as a result of its 
incompatibility with article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter, and that only an 
actual armed conflict can trigger the applicability of the laws of war,106 it may be 
possible to apply jus in bello in the absence of an armed conflict if there is a state 
of war in the technical sense. Dinstein argues that even though the application of 
jus in bello rarely emerges in practice for such situations, in extreme instances—
even if a state of war only exists in a technical sense—a belligerent may be in 
breach of jus in bello.107 Therefore, it is possible that jus in bello presently applies 
to the parties on the Korean Peninsula, even absent major ongoing hostilities. 
IV. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ARMISTICES 
Armed conflicts between states were traditionally terminated through 
conclusions of peace agreements. For example, the Peace of Westphalia treaties, 
which in 1648 concluded the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War, and 
the Treaty of Versailles, which in 1918 ended World War I, are two of the most-
recognized peace treaties of our time. However, whether a war can be terminated 
only through the conclusion of a peace agreement, or whether it can be concluded 
by an Armistice, is ambiguous. This Part will analyze the ability of an Armistice to 
end a war in the context of general international law principles, established 
through the practices of states and the opinions of legal scholars, to determine how 
these principles can be applied to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 
                                                                                                                       
105 See Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 62, 4 U.S.T. at 261 (“The Articles 
and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly 
superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an 
appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.”). 
106 See generally Greenwood, supra note 61. 
107 See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 10 n.31 (“In some extreme instances, even when the 
state of war exists only in a technical sense, a belligerent may still be in breach of the jus in 
bello. Thus, the mere issuance of a threat to an adversary that hostilities would be 
conducted on the basis of a ‘no quarter’ policy constitutes a violation of Article 40 of the 
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, [1977] 
UNJY 95, 110. Cf. Article 23(d) of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (Annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and (IV) of 1907), Hague 
Conventions 100, 107, 116.”). 
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A. General Principles 
The Annex to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land provides the definition of an “armistice” under 
international law. 108  Article 36 states that “[a]n armistice suspends military 
operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties.”109 Further, it 
states, “the belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, provided always 
that the enemy is warned.”110 The key words are “suspend” and “resume,” which 
imply that an armistice is a temporary, not a permanent, termination of war. In 
addition, an armistice’s temporary and limited nature is reflected in article 40, 
which provides that a serious violation of the armistice is grounds for denunciation 
and, in cases of urgency, the immediate recommencement of hostilities.111 
 
International law scholars such as Oppenheim and Howard Levie have 
claimed that an armistice agreement does not terminate a state of war between 
belligerents, and have emphasized that an armistice agreement is not a peace 
treaty.112 Specifically, Levie states, “[I]t may be stated as a positive rule that an 
armistice does not terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, 
either de jure or de facto, and that the state of war continues to exist and to control 
the actions of neutrals as well as belligerents.”113 These scholars believe that a 
state of war continues to exist, with all its implications for belligerent and neutral 
parties, after an armistice agreement is concluded. Additionally, Lord McNair has 
claimed that it is traditionally accepted under international law that an armistice 
agreement does not bring an end to a “state of war”; rather, the agreement 
temporarily suspends it.114 
 
However, Dinstein and Julius Stone have argued that, as armistice 
agreements have gained importance internationally, they rarely have been 
succeeded by peace agreements, but often remain the only agreements entered into 
                                                                                                                       
108 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, arts. 
36-41, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2305-06. 
109 Id. art. 36, 36 Stat. at 2305. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. art. 40, 36 Stat. at 2305-06. 
112 OPPENHEIM, supra note 52, at 546; see also Howard S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of 
the Armistice Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 880, 884 n.28 (1958) (“Oppenheim (op. cit. 
546) states that during a general armistice ‘the condition of war remains between the 
belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points beyond the 
mere cessation of hostilities.’ And . . . Fiore goes even further, cautioning that ‘both in the 
relations of public internal law and in those of international law, during an armistice, 
however long protracted, the law of war, not the law of peace, must be applied.’”). 
113 Levie, supra note 112, at 884. 
114 See MCNAIR & WATTS, supra note 56, at 13-14. 
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by the belligerents.115 Dinstein cites Israel’s wars with Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan 
to argue that these modern armistice agreements have brought de facto 
terminations of war, rather than just cessations of hostilities.116 Dinstein and Stone 
claim that the modern definition of an armistice agreement has evolved over the 
last half-century to mean the termination of a war, if the significance of a peace 
agreement is lost, and belligerent rights cannot continue.117  Further, Dinstein 
points to, in the case of the Korean Armistice Agreement, language in the 
document providing for “a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of 
armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved,” which 
indicates that the Agreement was not intended to be a suspension of hostilities, but 
rather to be a complete cessation of them, leading to the end of the war.118 In 
contrast, Oppenheim, Levie, and McNair believe that an armistice does not 
terminate a state of war, and so they would argue that the Korean Peninsula 
remains in a de jure state of war and that the rules of warfare still apply there. 
 
                                                                                                                       
115 See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 42 (“As for armistice, in the current practice of States, 
it denotes a termination of hostilities . . . a modern armistice completely divests the Parties 
of the right to renew military operations at any time and under any circumstances whatever. 
By putting an end to war, an armistice today does not brook resumption of hostilities as an 
option.”); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 644 (1954). 
116 See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 45-46 (“It is noteworthy that when the Security Council, 
in 1951, had to deal with an Israeli complaint concerning restrictions imposed by Egypt on 
the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, the Council adopted Resolution 95 
pronouncing that the armistice between the two countries ‘is of a permanent character’ and 
that, accordingly, ‘neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent’ . . . . 
[T]he Council totally rejected an Egyptian contention that a state of war continued to exist 
with Israel after the Armistice.”). In addition, the November 11, 1918 armistice between 
Germany and the Allies brought about the termination of World War I and established a de 
facto peace. See id. at 42. 
117 See id.; STONE, supra note 115, at 644. 
118  See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 43-44 (arguing that the Armistice Agreement 
terminated the Korean War, although it “did not produce peace in the full meaning of the 
term. . . . [t]he thesis (advanced in 1992) that ‘the Korean War is still legally in effect[,’] is 
untenable”) (footnote omitted). For the original language, see Korean Armistice 
Agreement, supra note 15, pmbl., ¶ 12, 4 U.S.T. at 236, 239 (“The undersigned . . . in the 
interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on 
both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete 
cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful 
settlement is achieved, do . . . agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the 
conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which 
said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain 
solely to the belligerents in Korea . . . . The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order 
and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their 
control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective 
twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed.”) (emphasis added). 
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Scholars in a third group, including Georg Schwarzenberger and Phillip 
Jessup, suggest the recognition of a “status mixtus,” or a state of intermediacy, 
between war and peace.119 Classical international law scholars such as Grotius 
deny the existence of a status mixtus.120 McNair has stated, “[W]ar and peace are 
alternatives between which no intermediate state exists.” 121  However, 
Schwarzenberger believes that the existence of a status mixtus, which has features 
of both a state of peace and a state of war, can be observed through examining 
state practice. 122  He asserts that, ultimately, third parties must subjectively 
determine whether a status mixtus exists.123  
 
Dinstein denies that such an independent third rubric exists, maintaining 
that only the states of war and peace legally exist, but grants that there could be 
situations in which the laws of war might apply during peacetime, and vice 
versa.124 For example, a state at peace might commit an act that is “short of war” 
but still regulated by the basic rules of warfare, which he terms “peacetime status 
mixtus.” 125  In addition, a situation where the parties are at war, but still 
maintaining diplomatic and trade relations and pursuing trade with one another, he 
refers to as a “wartime status mixtus.”126 As such, there is some room for debate 
about whether an armistice agreement terminates a state of war completely, merely 
ceases hostilities, or creates an intermediate state where the rules of warfare and 
laws of peace can apply simultaneously. 
 
In 1951, the legal effects of armistice agreements actually were contested 
before the U.N. Security Council as a result of the conflict between Israel and 
Egypt.127 Egypt declared that sailing its ships through the Suez Canal was a lawful 
exercise of its belligerent rights, while Israel argued that no state of war had ever 
                                                                                                                       
119 See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 15-16; Phillip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, Should 
International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between War and Peace?, 48 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 98, 100-03 (1954); Georg Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli?: Prolegomena to 
a Sociology of International Law, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 470 (1943). 
120 See LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 76 n.9 (2d ed. 1999) 
(“Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium.”) (quoting Grotius and, through him, Cicero); 3 
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1595 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 
2005) (Jean Barbeyrac trans., 1738) (1625) (“For as Cicero says, in his eighth Philippick, 
there is no Middle between War and Peace”.) (footnote omitted). 
121 MCNAIR & WATTS, supra note 56, at 3. 
122 GREEN, supra note 120, at 77; see also Schwarzenberger, supra note 119, at 470. 
123 GREEN, supra note 120, at 79. 
124 DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 16. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 18 n.61 (“The Soviet-Japanese armed conflict of 1939 may 
serve as a good example.”). 
127 Greenwood, supra note 61, at 287. 
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existed and, if it had, their 1949 armistice agreement had terminated it.128 Israel 
claimed that a state of war was incompatible with the U.N. Charter, because: 
 
The Charter has created a new world of international relations 
within which the traditional “rights of war” cannot be enthroned. 
Members of the United Nations are pledged to refrain entirely in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force, except 
on behalf of the purposes of the United Nations. There can, 
therefore, be no room within the regime of the Charter for any 
generic doctrine of belligerency since belligerency is nothing but a 
political and legal formula for regulating the threat or use of 
force . . . Israel is in no state of war with Egypt and denies that 
Egypt has the least right to be at war with Israel.129 
 
On September 1, 1951, the U.N. Security Council sided with Israel and 
declared: 
 
[S]ince the armistice regime, which has been in existence for 
nearly two and a half years, is of permanent character, neither 
party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or 
required to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any 
legitimate purpose of self-defence . . . .130 
 
As such, the changes in international law as a result of the adoption of the U.N. 
Charter indicate that the United Nations has taken a strict approach in recognizing 
belligerent rights and the effects of laws of war after the conclusion of an armistice 
agreement. 
 
These scholarly opinions and the Israel–Egypt case show that armistice 
agreements may, depending on the circumstances, terminate the state of war and 
the belligerent rights that accompany it. Since states have duties to refrain from 
using force under article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter, there is a tendency to 
hold that armistice agreements terminate the state of war. Nevertheless, there may 
also be instances where a state is in a status mixtus, in which it experiences 
elements of both war and peace or, as Dinstein has proposed, there may be 
situations both of peacetime status mixtus and of wartime status mixtus. These 
situations must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the 
intentions of the parties and the facts particular to each case. 
                                                                                                                       
128 Id. 
129 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting the Israeli representative). 
130 Id. at 287-88 (quoting S.C. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. S/RES/95 (Sept. 1, 1951)). 
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B. Application 
The preamble to the Korean Armistice Agreement states that the 
Agreement’s objective is to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all 
acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.”131 In 
article I, the Agreement fixes a military demarcation line and a demilitarized 
zone.132 The Agreement does not establish a maritime border between the two 
Koreas; rather, the U.N. Command fixed the NLL as the maritime border after the 
Agreement was signed. Article II provides concrete arrangements for 
implementing the cease-fire and the Armistice.133 For example, it requires the 
parties’ commanders to “withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and 
equipment from the demilitarized zone,”134 and establishes the Military Armistice 
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 135  These 
commissions were established to supervise the implementation of the Agreement 
by making periodic reports through Joint Observer Teams, conducting inspections 
through Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and acting as intermediaries for 
transmitting communications between the commanders of both sides.136 However, 
these supervising bodies became immobilized after the North refused to cooperate 
in these mechanisms, disputing the neutrality of the commissions. 137  Other 
regulations include provisions on the status of prisoners of war, and paragraph 61 
states that “[a]mendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be 
mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.”138 
 
Based on these and other similar terms, one can infer that the parties 
intended that the Korean Armistice Agreement would terminate the war, not 
merely suspend it. First, the parties called for “a complete cessation of all 
hostilities” and “concrete arrangements” to implement the Agreement.139 Second, 
the Agreement provided for military demarcation lines, the withdrawal of military 
forces, and the establishment of two commissions to ensure that there would be no 
hostilities on the ground. 140  Third, there are no provisions governing the 
resumption of hostilities,141 which indicates that the parties did not intend to 
                                                                                                                       
131 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, pmbl., 4 U.S.T. at 236. 
132 Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 4 U.S.T. at 237. 
133 Id. art. II, 4 U.S.T. at 239-53. 
134 Id. ¶ 13(a), 4 U.S.T. at 239. 
135 Id. art. II, §§ B-C, 4 U.S.T. at 244-53. 
136 Id. 
137 See BAILEY, supra note 27, at 171-88; CHI YOUNG PAK, KOREA AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 85 (2000). 
138 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 61, 4 U.S.T. at 261. 
139 Id. art II, ¶ 12, 4 U.S.T. at 239. 
140 Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 11, 4 U.S.T. at 237-38. 
141 Cf. id. ¶ 1, 4 U.S.T. at 237 (“A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone 
to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.”). 
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resume armed conflict. Although the Agreement recommends that the parties 
begin negotiations for a peace settlement, the peace settlement would have been 
targeted towards establishing a positive peace by building diplomatic relations. 
Overall, the parties seem to have intended to terminate the war completely, which 
means they would not have intended the rules of warfare to apply after they had 
signed the Armistice Agreement. 
 
However, there has been imperfect compliance with the Agreement. The 
political and military relations between the two Koreas remain tense, and the 
situation is aggravated by North Korea’s consistent development of nuclear 
weapons and its sporadic military provocations near the Yellow Sea maritime 
border. Since it signed the Armistice Agreement, the DPRK has committed many 
military provocations against South Korea by armed invasions, infiltration 
attempts, and terrorist acts.142 
 
Specifically, North Korea made 3,693 infiltration attempts into the South 
between 1954 and 1992.143 It has committed terrorist acts, such as the 1968 and 
1974 attempts to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee,144 the 1983 attempt 
to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan by a bombing in Rangoon, and the 1987 
bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane.145 In addition, naval 
skirmishes have taken place near the DPRK–ROK maritime border. On June 15, 
1999, the First Battle of Yeonpyeong occurred off the coast of Yeonpyeong Island. 
North Korea claimed, through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA),146 that 
South Korean warships had violated the “sea boundary line,” which prompted 
                                                                                                                       
142  See HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30004, NORTH KOREAN 
PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, 1950–2007, at summary (2007) (“North Korea . . . [has] staged a 
series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security interests. 
Infiltration of armed agents . . . was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, 
followed by kidnaping and terrorism (actual and threatened). . . . North Korea’s major 
terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 
1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing incident 
in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean 
Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987. Reported provocations have continued intermittently 
in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn 
the South Korean capital of Seoul into ‘a sea of fire’ and to silence or tame South Korean 
critics of North Korea.”); see also PAK, supra note 137, at 84-87 (discussing North Korea’s 
violations of the Armistice Agreement); Mark Tran, North and South Korea: A History of 
Violence, GUARDIAN, May 20, 2010,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/20/korea-assassination-attempts-clashes-
standoffs (outlining violent conflicts between North and South Korea). 
143 FISCHER, supra note 142, at summary, 4 n.6. 
144 See id. at summary, 4, 6; Tran, supra note 142. 
145 See FISCHER, supra note 142, at summary, 8-10. 
146 The KCNA is also known as the Chosun Central News Agency, in reference to Korea’s 
Joseon Dynasty. 
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DPRK ships to cross the NLL.147 The South Korean navy began to respond 
forcibly, and the incident led to a military confrontation.148 More naval skirmishes 
have occurred since, such as the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002 and the 
Battle of Daecheong in 2009, which have increased tensions between the DPRK 
and ROK governments.149 In 2010, tensions escalated again due to the sinking of 
the ROK warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Such military 
provocations are often left unresolved because the supervising agencies are 
immobilized. 
 
In addition, the DPRK and ROK governments have not established 
amicable relations: while they occasionally hold inter-Korean dialogues through 
high-level military talks, and have concluded several inter-Korean agreements, 
they presently do not have economic or diplomatic relations.150 As a result, the 
                                                                                                                       
147  See Balderdash About “Northern Limit Line”, KOREAN CENT. NEWS AGENCY, 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOR. (July 11, 1999), 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9907/news07/11.htm (“The South Korean war hawks, far 
from making an apology for the premeditated armed provocation committed by them in the 
West Sea of Korea on June 15, keep peddling the ‘northern limit line,’ raising a hue and 
cry over someone’s ‘violation’ of the Armistice Agreement (AA). Commenting on this, 
Rodong Sinmun today says the ‘northern limit line’ on their lips is a ‘ghost line’ which is 
not stipulated in the AA and upon which no agreement was reached by both sides.”); S. 
Korean Warships Intrude into North, KOREAN CENT. NEWS AGENCY, DEMOCRATIC 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOR. (June 6, 1999), 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9906/news06/06.htm (“The South Korean ruling quarters 
committed a grave military provocation of illegally intruding warships deep into the 
territorial waters of the north side southeast of Ssanggyo-ri, Kangryong county, South 
Hwanghae Province, on June 5, military sources said. Three warships of South Korea, 
having watched the movement of fishing boats of the north, which were catching fish at 
sea off Soyonphyong Islet, proceeded northward at full steam across the sea boundary line 
in an attempt to commit hostile acts. No sooner had a patrol boat of the Navy of the Korean 
People’s Army defending the sea post of the country with vigilance sailed to the scene than 
the enemy’s warships fled southward in a hurry. This provocation act is a premeditated 
move to lead the inter-Korean confrontation to its extreme pitch by artificially aggravating 
the situation on the Korean peninsula.”) (emphasis added); see also FISCHER, supra note 
142, at 19 n.38 (citing KCNA propaganda reports). 
148 See FISCHER, supra note 142, at 18-19 (summarizing the conflict). 
149 See, e.g., id. at 24 (“6/29/02—A gun battle erupted between South and North Korean 
naval ships in the Yellow Sea. North Korean patrol boats allegedly crossed the Northern 
Limit Line and opened fire on a South Korean patrol boat. Four South Koreans and an 
undetermined number of North Koreans were killed.”); see also Northern Limit Line (NLL) 
West Sea Naval Engagements, GLOBAL SEC. (last modified Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nll.htm (listing and describing North and 
South Korean naval engagements from 1999 to 2011). 
150 See JAE-CHEON LIM, KIM JONG IL’S LEADERSHIP OF NORTH KOREA 119 (2009) 
(“Before the [2000 Inter-Korean] summit, there were several meaningful inter-Korean 
events and agreements—the 4 July joint communiqué of 1972; the ‘Agreement on 
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Korean Peninsula cannot be completely at peace because it still faces elements of 
war today. The Korean Peninsula is instead in Dinstein’s “peacetime status mixtus,” 
a state of peace that possesses certain elements of war.151 More specifically, 
Dinstein states: 
 
Because a state of peace continues to prevail, (i) most of the 
relations between the States concerned are still governed by the 
laws of peace, and (ii) the laws of neutrality are not activated 
between the antagonists and third Parties. Nevertheless, the actual 
fighting will be governed by the jus in bello.152 
 
The parties intended to end the war, and modern armistice agreements are 
held to terminate war under international law; consequently, absent special 
circumstances, jus in bello should not apply and belligerent rights should not be 
recognized, since the parties have signed an armistice agreement. However, jus in 
bello can apply when there are actual hostilities between parties in a state of 
peacetime status mixtus, even if such hostilities do not rise to the level of “armed 
conflict”; therefore, when armed hostilities occur, the laws of war may still be 
applicable to the DPRK–ROK conflict today, because the Korean Peninsula is in a 
state of peacetime status mixtus. 
V. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF DENOUNCING AN ARMISTICE OR OF 
RESUMING HOSTILITIES 
Even though the ROK and DPRK are obligated to abide by the terms of 
the Armistice Agreement and not to resume armed hostilities, a resumption of 
                                                                                                                       
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (North–South Basic 
Agreement)’; and the ‘Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ in 
1991. But those events and agreements had occurred irregularly and intermittently . . . .”); 
see also James M. Minnich, Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Challenges and 
Opportunities in Readjusting the U.S.–ROK Alliance, in A TURNING POINT: DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE ROK AND STRATEGIC READJUSTMENT IN THE US–ROK ALLIANCE 
268, 281 (Alexandre Y. Mansourov ed., 2005) (“With the exception of the 1972 South–
North Joint Communiqué, which addressed unification issues, these two antithetical 
nations remained bitterly opposed until 1990, when great initial strides were taken towards 
normalization. As mentioned, the 1990s ushered in momentous changes in North Korea’s 
habitual relations with the Soviet Union (and later Russia) and China, resulting in the 
DPRK’s acceptance of a more conciliatory policy toward its traditional opponents—the 
ROK and Japan. By the fall of 1991, prime ministerial talks, which had begun a year 
earlier, began making rapid progress towards rapprochement, culminating with the signing 
in December of two major agreements—the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression 
and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North; and the Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”). 
151 DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 16. 
152 Id. 
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hostilities may be justified under chapter V of the Annex to the Hague Convention 
(IV).153 In addition, the Geneva Conventions’ provisions apply, and belligerent 
rights can be recognized, when there is a declared war or an armed conflict.154 
Therefore, if either party declared war or another armed conflict began, belligerent 
rights could be recognized on the Korean Peninsula. In this context, this Article 
will examine how the DPRK’s denouncements of the Armistice Agreement in 
2009 and in early 2013, potentially tantamount to declarations of war, and the 
2010 confrontations, could affect the applicability of the Geneva Conventions.155 
A. General Principles 
After signing an armistice agreement, parties will aim to limit future acts 
of force in order to effectively implement the agreement. Therefore, chapter V of 
the Hague Convention (IV) sets forth certain conditions that must be met before 
hostilities are recommenced. 156  Article 36 stipulates that “if [the armistice 
agreement’s] duration is not fixed, the belligerent parties may resume operations at 
any time, provided always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, 
in accordance with the terms of the armistice.”157 Thus, to resume hostilities, a 
party must first warn the enemy within the agreed-upon time; if there is no agreed-
upon time, the notification presumably must be made within a reasonable period of 
time.158 Second, hostilities must resume according to the terms of the armistice, 
which implies that the armistice agreement may provide conditions for the 
resumption of hostilities.159 The reference to a defined duration of an armistice 
implies that military operations cannot resume during that time. However, under 
                                                                                                                       
153 See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra 
note 108, Annex, art. 40, 36 Stat. at 2305-06 (“Any serious violation of the armistice by 
one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of 
urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.”). 
154 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3116 (“[T]he present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict . . . .”). 
155 North Korea has made similar declarations attempting to withdraw from the Agreement 
in the past. Its repeated claimed desire to abrogate the Agreement raises the juxtaposed 
questions of whether such an oft-condemned document could still be in effect, and whether 
Pyongyang doth protest too much; clearly, its unilateral attempts to withdraw have been 
either legally unsuccessful or practically ignored, if it has had to resort to the same tactic 
repeatedly. For a legal discussion of withdrawal, see infra Section V.B. 
156 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 
108, Annex, arts. 36-41, 36 Stat. at 2305-06. 
157 Id. art. 36, 36 Stat. at 2305. 
158 DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 59. Alternatively, it is possible that if no resumption rights 
are specified, none exist. For the United Nations’ take on armistice termination, see Chang, 
infra note 175; infra note 178. 
159 Again, if resumption is not provided for in the document, it is possible that the parties to 
it did not (at the time of signing) intend for hostilities to be able to reoccur. 
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article 40, a party can resume hostilities when one of the contracting parties to the 
agreement commits a serious violation of the armistice.160 
 
Therefore, chapter V provides that the parties cannot as a general rule 
denounce the armistice, and that hostilities can recommence only if there has been 
either a serious violation of the armistice or if the fixed time of the armistice has 
elapsed. 161  The condition for notification only seems to be a procedural 
requirement. Any “serious violation” of the agreement should be in accordance 
with the “material breach” provision under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which is defined as a “repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the 
present Convention” or a “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment 
of the object or purpose of the treaty.”162 
 
Additionally, since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, the principles in the 
Hague Convention (IV) should be interpreted to comply with the U.N. Charter’s 
principles on the use of force.163 While the use of force is expressly prohibited 
                                                                                                                       
160 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 
108, Annex, art. 40, 36 Stat. at 2305-06. 
161 Id. arts. 36, 40, 36 Stat. at 2305-06. 
162 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, ¶¶ 1, 3, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 346 (“A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the 
other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its 
operation in whole or in part. . . . A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this 
article, consists in: (a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; 
or (b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose 
of the treaty.”); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 57-58 (discussing the implications of 
“material breach” with relation to “cease-fire arrangement[s]”); Quincy Wright, Editorial 
Comment, The Termination and Suspension of Treaties, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1000, 1005 
(1967) (examining the language of the draft Vienna Convention). The Vienna Convention 
is more precatory than controlling in this case, as the United States signed but never 
ratified it, North Korea is not a signatory, and South Korea only acceded to the Convention 
in 1977. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&ch
apter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). Articles 1 and 2 lay out 
the Convention’s scope as applying only to “treaties between States,” defined as 
“international agreement[s] concluded between States,” which may not apply to the 
Armistice, particularly given its execution by a U.N. representative. See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 172, arts. 1-2, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333. 
Article 4 states that “[w]ithout prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the 
present Convention to which treaties would be subject under any international law 
independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are 
concluded by states after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such 
States.” Id. art. 4, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334. 
163 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
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during times of peace, it is a jus cogens norm that must be complied with at all 
times.164 Greenwood has clarified that, as a general rule, the use of force is 
prohibited under international law, and resumption of hostilities would be a 
violation of the U.N. Charter unless a state needed to act in self-defense under 
article 51 because “the behaviour of the other party to the armistice or ceasefire 
amounted to an armed attack or the threat of an armed attack.”165 A party should 
not resume hostilities except to protect itself from a threat or an actual armed 
attack. If a party has no choice but to resume hostilities, Greenwood emphasizes 
that its actions must constitute a “necessary and proportionate” response to the 
threat or initial armed attack that it is responding to.166 
B. North Korea’s Declaration Not to Be Bound to the Armistice 
North Korea has made several attempts to nullify the Korean Armistice 
since the 1990s. For example, on May 27, 2009, the DPRK announced through the 
KCNA that its military would no longer be bound by the Korean Armistice 
Agreement,167 on the grounds that South Korea had breached the Agreement by 
                                                                                                                       
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”). 
164 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 510-11 (7th ed. 2008) 
(“Jurists have from time to time attempted to classify rules, or rights and duties, on the 
international plane by use of terms like ‘fundamental’ or . . . ‘inalienable’ . . . . Such 
classifications have not had much success, but have intermittently affected the 
interpretation of treaties by tribunals. In the recent past both doctrine and judicial opinion 
have supported the view that certain overriding principles of international law exist, 
forming a body of jus cogens. The major distinguishing feature of such rules is their 
relative indelibility. They are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or 
acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect. 
The least controversial examples of the class are the prohibition of the use of force, the law 
of genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the 
rules prohibiting trade in slavery and piracy. In the Barcelona Traction case . . . the 
majority judgment . . . drew a distinction between obligations of a state arising vis-à-vis 
another state and obligations ‘towards the international community as a whole.’”) 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
165  Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 68 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2008); see also See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”). 
166 Greenwood, supra note 165, at 68. 
167 The United Nations did not accept the North’s declaration as a valid or meaningful 
nullification or withdrawal. See Chang, infra note 175; infra note 178. 
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announcing that it would join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).168 
North Korea claimed that the ROK’s participation was a violation of the Armistice 
Agreement, because the PSI potentially committed South Korea to interdict DPRK 
ships, if they were “suspected of carrying nuclear weapons.”169 North Korea based 
its argument on provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which states that 
“all opposing naval forces . . . shall respect the waters contiguous to the 
Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the 
opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.”170 South 
Korea was not a member of the PSI movement until May 26, 2009, when the ROK 
government officially announced its intention to join approximately ninety other 
member countries.171 In March 2013, the DPRK made a similar announcement, 
which drew condemnation from both the United States and South Korea.172 
 
The question is whether North Korea has the right to terminate the 
Armistice Agreement by this kind of declaration. Dapo Akande, Lecturer at 
                                                                                                                       
168 Heejin Koo & Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Clinton Warns North Korea for ‘Belligerent’ 
Behavior in Region, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aS17xp.yHokM. 
169 Id. 
170 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 15, 4 U.S.T. at 243. 
171 S. Korea Joins PSI, North Irate, UNITED PRESS INT’L (May 27, 2009, 2:07 AM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/27/S-Korea-joins-PSI-North-irate/UPI-
37271243404462. 
172 See Anne Gearan & Chico Harlan, U.S. Officials Warn N. Korea After It Scraps 
Armistice, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/n-korea-
says-it-has-scrapped-armistice-that-ended-korean-war/2013/03/11/47762d7a-8a2c-11e2-
98d9-3012c1cd8d1e_story.html (describing U.S. threats of “use [of] military force if 
necessary,” “fresh sanctions against North Korea,” and “joint exercises with . . . South 
Korea,” in conjunction with the North’s announcement “that it had ‘completely scrapped’ 
the 1953 armistice agreement,” and noting that “North Korea has made several similar 
announcements in the past, most recently in 2009, and analysts cautioned this latest 
declaration could prove to be bluster[;] [e]xperts also noted that Pyongyang—whether 
bound by the cease-fire or not—has occasionally ignored its terms, most notably with fatal 
attacks on the South in 2010”); N. Korea Says Korean War Armistice Can Be Nullified 
Unilaterally, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 14, 2013, 18:46 KST), 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2013/03/14/47/0200000000AEN201303140119003
15F.HTML (“The announcement by Pyongyang comes as both Seoul and Washington said 
the ceasefire agreement can only be scrapped or changed if all signatories agree to it.”); see 
also Chico Harlan, S. Korea Says It Will Strike Against North’s Top Leadership if 
Provoked, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/s-korea-
says-it-will-strike-against-norths-top-leadership-if-provoked/2013/03/06/817eedfe-8671-
11e2-a80b-3edc779b676f_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop (“South Korea’s military warned 
Wednesday that it would respond to any attack from North Korea with ‘strong and stern 
measures’ against Pyongyang’s top leadership, a particularly vivid threat that comes after 
the North vowed to nullify the armistice agreement ending the Korean War. The tit-for-tat 
threats could prove to be mere bluster, analysts said.”). 
2013]    WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA              75 
Oxford Law, argues that a mere verbal termination will not cause an armed 
conflict to resume, and the actual use of force is required to trigger belligerent 
rights.173 Even though such a denouncement may be considered a declaration of 
war under the Geneva Conventions, Akande emphasizes that recognizing a verbal 
termination as such would present serious legal consequences, because it would 
provide the parties with a legal basis to use force against one another.174 For 
example, Gordon Chang has argued that the United States ought to recognize 
belligerent rights, so that it can inspect more robustly North Korean vessels under 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which requires states to inspect vessels on 
the high seas if they are believed to violate U.N. sanctions against North Korea.175 
 
In addition, it is generally recognized that the effects and significance of 
declared wars have been restricted since the adoption of the U.N. Charter. 
Previously, a declaration of a war was a prerequisite to allowing the laws of armed 
conflict to take effect. However, today, actual armed hostilities must resume 
before belligerent rights can be recognized. In this case, armed hostilities had not 
been initiated at the time of the DPRK’s announcement. Furthermore, under article 
40 of the Hague Convention (IV), North Korea is entitled to resume armed conflict 
only if South Korea commits a serious violation of the Armistice Agreement.176 
                                                                                                                       
173 Dapo Akande, The Korean War Has Resumed!! (Or So We Are Told), EJIL: TALK! (July 
22, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-korean-war-has-resumed-or-so-we-are-told/. 
174 Id. 
175 Gordon G. Chang, How to Stop North Korea’s Weapons Proliferation, WALL ST. J., 
July 1, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124640610149276731.html. He writes: 
 
The North Koreans have, inadvertently, given the U.S. a way to escape 
from the restrictions of the new Security Council measure. On May 27, 
the Korean People’s Army issued a statement declaring that it “will not 
be bound” by the armistice that ended fighting in the Korean War. This 
was at least the third time Pyongyang has disavowed the interim 
agreement that halted hostilities in 1953. Previous renunciations were 
announced in 2003 and 2006. 
The U.N. Command, a signatory to the armistice, shrugged off 
Pyongyang’s belligerent statement. “The armistice remains in force and 
is binding on all signatories, including North Korea,” it said immediately 
after the renunciation, referring to the document’s termination provisions. 
That may be the politically correct thing to say, but an armistice as a 
legal matter cannot remain in existence after one of its parties, a 
sovereign state, announces its end. Today, whether we like it or not, 
there is no armistice. 
 
Id. 
176 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 
108, Annex, art. 40, 36 Stat. at 2305-06 (“Any serious violation of the armistice by one of 
the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, 
of recommencing hostilities immediately.”). 
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However, the ROK’s participation in the PSI movement does not seem to rise to 
“material breach” of the Agreement, as expounded by the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.177 
 
Finally, commentators, scholars, and government representatives generally 
view the DPRK’s declarations as political statements threatening South Korea, and 
not as official declarations of war.178 It is common for North Korea to use such 
harsh rhetoric and the DPRK has made similar statements to the United States and 
South Korea in the past, such as declaring that it would initiate an “all-out war.” 
For example, North Korea threatened “a sea of fire” upon the ROK’s presidential 
office after South Korea conducted military drills.179 On February 25, 2012, the 
DPRK vowed a “sacred war” against the United States and the ROK, as a response 
to their planned joint military exercises. 180  Moreover, paragraph 61 of the 
Armistice Agreement states that “[a]mendments and additions to this Armistice 
Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides,” 
implying that North Korea cannot unilaterally abrogate or terminate the 
agreement.181 As a result, international law is unlikely to support these statements 
as resulting in the resumption of war and the recognition of belligerents’ rights. 
                                                                                                                       
177 See supra note 162 (explaining relevant terms of the Vienna Convention). 
178 See, e.g., Interview by World Politics Review with Balbina Y. Hwang, Visiting 
Professor, Georgetown Univ. (Mar. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12807/global-insider-north-korea-s-
armistice-nullification-is-more-bark-than-bite; Associated Press, U.N.: Korean War 
Armistice Still in Force, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2013, 1:13 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/11/un-korea-armistice/1978909/; 
Alastair Gale, North Korea (Again) Claims It Will Nullify Armistice, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 
2013, 7:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/03/07/north-korea-again-claims-
it-will-nullify-armistice/; Bruce Klingner, North Korea Abandons Armistice . . . Again, 
FOUNDRY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 5, 2013, 4:45 PM), 
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/05/north-korea-abandons-armisticeagain/; Ed Krayewski, 
The Korean War Is Not Over: North Korea Declares Armistice Null, United Nations 
Disagrees, REASON (Mar. 11, 2013, 6:20 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/11/the-
korean-war-is-not-over-north-korea-d; Howard LaFranchi, Why North Korea Threat to 
Abandon Armistice Rings Hollow, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0305/Why-North-Korea-threat-to-
abandon-armistice-rings-hollow. 
179 North Korea Threatens ‘a Sea of Fire’ upon South Korea, CNN (Nov. 24, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-24/asia/world_asia_north-korea-sea-of-
fire_1_yeonpyeong-island-north-korea-military-provocation?_s=PM:ASIA. 
180 Sung-won Shim, North Korea Vows “Sacred War” Against S. Korea, U.S., REUTERS 
(Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/25/us-korea-north-
idUSTRE81O0AK20120225. 
181 Korean Armistice Agreement, supra note 15, ¶ 61, 4 U.S.T. at 261; see also Rick 
Gladstone, Threats Sow Concerns over Korean Armistice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/asia/threats-sow-concerns-over-korean-
armistice.html (“The armistice states that any change must be agreed to by all the signers 
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C. The Sinking of the Cheonan and the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island 
The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents may be “armed conflict[s]” 
under international law for the purpose of applying jus in bello. If they are, 
regardless of whether the Korean Peninsula is at war or in a peacetime status 
mixtus, the incidents themselves could be sufficient for the laws of war to apply, 
since the Geneva Conventions apply to “armed conflict[s].”182 This Section will 
analyze whether the incidents constitute one or more armed conflicts within the 
term’s meaning under international law, by examining tribunal jurisprudence and 
scholarly opinions. 
 
The ILA’s 2010 report states that “at least two characteristics are found 
with respect to all armed conflict: 1.) The existence of organized armed groups 2.) 
Engaged in fighting of some intensity.”183 The second Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions provides that armed conflicts must be distinguished from 
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature . . . .”184 If attacks are 
recognized as armed conflicts under international law, the ICC has jurisdiction to 
try, and potentially hold accountable, the perpetrators for war crimes, provided 
that the case is otherwise admissible to the court. Depending on how the conflict is 
characterized in terms of whether it is an international or a non-international 
conflict, different specific provisions under article 8 of the Rome Statute for war 
crimes would apply.185 
 
The shelling on Yeonpyeong Island met the organization criterion. The 
incident included fighting between two organized armed groups: the ROK and the 
DPRK. Both groups have substantial command structures, the abilities to exercise 
control through stable leadership, governance by rules, provision of military 
training, organized acquisition and provision of weapons and supplies, recruitment 
of new members, existence of communication infrastructure, and space to rest, as 
                                                                                                                       
and that unilateral declarations are unacceptable—a point reiterated Thursday by Gen. 
James D. Thurman, the American commander in charge of enforcing the armistice 
conditions. He was responding to the North’s assertion that it would consider the armistice 
null and void as of Monday, when military exercises by the United States and South Korea 
get under way. . . . Last week, North Korea’s main party newspaper said that the country 
was justified in unilaterally nullifying the armistice because its repeated demands for peace 
talks since the 1970s had been snubbed by Washington.”). 
182 Geneva Conventions, supra note 50, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3116. 
183 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 2. 
184 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1, ¶ 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
185 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 8, ¶ 2, 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 94-98. The war crimes listed under article 8, paragraph 2(a) and (b), are 
applicable only in international armed conflicts; in contrast, the war crimes under 
paragraph 2(c) and (e) are applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Id. 
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specified in Milosevic.186 Since an international investigation group determined 
that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan,187 the incident 
was caused by an attack of an organized armed group. The international team 
confirmed that the torpedo was highly explosive, with a net explosive weight of 
about 250 kilograms, and had been manufactured by North Korea. 188  The 
propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section were found at the site of 
the sinking, and there were Hangul markings inside one propulsion section, which 
read “No. 1.”189 This marking matched, in size and shape, the drawings and 
specifications that North Korea had provided to foreign countries in introductory 
exporting materials.190 Even if the DPRK’s claims that it was not the perpetrator 
are true, the intensity of the attack is per se sufficient evidence that it was 
perpetrated by a well-organized group. 
 
The sinking of the Cheonan also met the intensity criterion. In the 
international investigation group’s May 2010 presentation reporting its findings, it 
concluded that the 1200-ton warship was sunk by a North Korean torpedo.191 
Furthermore, the team concluded, based upon an objective scientific investigation, 
that an underwater torpedo explosion had caused a shockwave and bubble effect, 
which split apart and sunk the Cheonan.192 There was no direct fighting between 
the parties, but there were a significant number of casualties. Moreover, the 
incident attracted international attention; for example, on July 9, 2010, the U.N. 
Security Council released a Presidential Statement condemning the attack, 
determining that such an incident endangered regional peace and security, and 
calling for the parties to adhere to the Korean Armistice Agreement.193 
 
However, it is not clear whether the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island 
satisfied the intensity criterion. The DPRK perpetrated artillery attacks against the 
ROK, openly targeting civilians on the island.194 According to news reports, at 
least 50 shells landed on the island, most of which hit the South Korean military 
base; in response, South Korea fired back approximately 80 shells.195 The shelling 
lasted for about an hour. The number of North Korean casualties is unknown.196 
                                                                                                                       
186 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of 
Acquittal, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004). 
187 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, supra note 2. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/13, supra note 4. 
194 Mark McDonald, Anxiety in Seoul as Civilian Deaths Are Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/asia/25seoul.html. 
195 See, e.g., North Korean Artillery Hits South Korean Island, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11818005. 
196 See id. 
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The DPRK justified its actions by claiming that South Korea had committed 
reckless military provocations against its territory, although the South had actually 
been conducting regular military drills in the sea off of Yeonpyeong Island’s coast 
and had not intended to fire on North Korea.197 Based on these reports, the facts 
may not meet the ILA’s proposed intensity criterion. 
 
The biggest challenge to recognizing these two attacks as armed conflicts 
is that they did not last for protracted periods of time, which is an element of the 
Tadic test.198 An armed conflict usually arises through retaliation against a single 
armed attack; however, the ROK did not retaliate against North Korea in the 
Cheonan incident, even though it had the right to use force in self-defense under 
article 51. In the Yeonpyeong Island incident, South Korea fired shells back in 
self-defense, which was necessary and proportionate to North Korea’s attack, but 
the shelling only lasted an hour. Nevertheless, the ILA report states, “[e]ven in the 
absence of armed conflict, a member of the armed forces may invoke IHL 
[(international humanitarian law)] to justify the use of lethal force,” and refers to 
the sinking of the Cheonan as an example of such a situation.199 As such, it is not 
clear whether these two confrontations should be identified as armed conflicts, but 
all in all this Article posits that the laws of warfare applied at the times of the 
confrontations. The intensity of the attacks against the Cheonan and against the 
civilians on Yeonpyeong Island indicates that these attacks were not border 
clashes, but rather military confrontations that arose amidst constant political and 
military tensions. 
                                                                                                                       
197 See id. 
198 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see 
also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 40-49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (reviewing interpretations of the term 
“protracted armed violence”); supra Section III.B. 
199 INT’L LAW ASSOC., supra note 65, at 31 (“Even in the absence of armed conflict, a 
member of the armed forces may invoke IHL to justify the use of lethal force. The case of 
the South Korean warship Cheonan provides an example. . . . This type of attack could 
give rise to a right to respond in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, given either additional information about likely future attacks or Security Council 
authorization. Nevertheless, South Korea has not responded with military force.”). It is 
unclear whether North Korea intended for the laws of warfare to apply when it engaged in 
its two military provocations. Regardless, as a party to the Geneva Conventions (albeit 
with some reservations) and to their Additional Protocol I, it is subject to their precepts. 
See North Korea—International Treaties Adherence, RULE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
PROJECT, http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=50 (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2013). South Korea has also ratified the Geneva Conventions, including 
the two Additional Protocols. See South Korea—International Treaties Adherence, RULE 
OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT, http://www.adh-
geneva.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=51 (last updated Nov. 30, 2009). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the attacks’ intensities and the status of the military conflict 
on the Korean Peninsula, this Article proposes that jus in bello has been invoked 
and applies to the sinking of the Cheonan and to the shelling on Yeonpyeong 
Island. Some scholars believe that the two incidents fall short of “armed conflict[s]” 
in which jus in bello could be invoked because they did not last for protracted 
periods of time, instead merely rising to the level of border clashes. As a result, the 
incidents and their collateral effects would not be recognized as war crimes. 
However, even if these attacks did not match the definition of “armed conflict” 
under international law, the application of jus in bello should be possible, because 
the Korean Peninsula is in a peacetime status mixtus. In that condition, most 
peacetime laws apply; however, when there are armed hostilities, the rules of 
warfare apply whether or not the hostilities constitute “armed conflict.” Therefore, 
it is possible that these two confrontations are violations of the laws of war; 
however, whether these acts meet the definition of “war crimes,” as acts directly 
attacking civilians or causing excessive incidental deaths, injuries, and damage, 
and whether they are admissible before the ICC, will have to be examined further. 
Essentially, recognizing the Korean Peninsula to be in a peacetime status mixtus 
can provide the ICC with grounds and jurisdiction to hold the leaders of the 
attacks accountable. If the laws of war were inapplicable, the ICC would not have 
jurisdiction over these attacks. 
 
In addition, recognizing the laws of war during a peacetime status mixtus 
does not mean that the parties can exercise belligerent rights freely. Belligerent 
rights should be recognized only when there are actual armed hostilities on the 
ground. A party to the Korean Armistice should use force only as an act of self-
defense, in accordance with article 51 of the U.N. Charter.200 Furthermore, force 
should be used only when it is necessary for self-defense, and such force should be 
proportionate to the threat or attack being responded to. Otherwise, the respondent 
itself may be responsible for violating article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter, 
which prohibits any armed attack. 
 
During the Yeonpyeong Island hostilities, each party justified using force: 
North Korea claimed that South Korea’s drills were a threat, while South Korea 
stated that it retaliated to protect its civilians. The sinking of the Cheonan was a 
clearer and unilateral violation of article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter, but 
North Korea continues to deny its involvement. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula 
are unlikely to ease anytime soon. North Korea may threaten to initiate another 
war with the ROK, as it often does through the KCNA. South Korea likely will 
                                                                                                                       
200 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”). 
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continue conducting military drills with the United States. The ideal solution 
would be to resolve the problem through diplomatic talks, but the Six-Party Talks 
came to a halt in 2007, and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons has 
been a constant challenge for the parties involved. 
 
In the future, both North and South Korea should comply with the terms 
of the Armistice to prevent future attacks. In addition, the ICC should continue its 
preliminary examination into the sinking of the Cheonan, while bearing in mind 
the question of the current legal status of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It is 
not yet clear whether the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents are 
admissible at the ICC, but it is clear that jus in bello was in effect at the time these 
attacks occurred, providing a possible legal basis for holding the perpetrators 
accountable for war crimes.  
VII. APPENDIX: DETAILED COASTAL MAP 
 
 
Source: North Korean Artillery Hits South Korean Island, supra note 195. 
